In "Teletraffic and Datatraffic" (Editors A. Jensen and V.B. Iversen),
Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1991. 93-98.
The understanding of the performance and design of national networks with rerouting is now well advanced. In particular, simple and robust dynamic routing strategies, and sympathetic dimensioning procedures, have been developed. However, the extension of this understanding to international networks requires consideration of a number of new issues. An important example concerns the partitioning of benefits. Joint action will lead to a surplus of benefits over costs, relative to the present arrangements. How should these benefits be divided between carriers? In this paper we consider which divisions are likely to be stable against competing (and overlapping) coalitions. In particular we investigate coalitions comprising 3, 4 and 5 members selected from a set of 6 countries: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, UK and the USA. The theoretical tools we use are multi-commodity flow theory and the theory of games.