Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control

Automatica 35 (1999), 1969-1985.

We describe ways in which the transmission control protocol of the Internet may evolve to support heterogeneous applications. We show that by appropriately marking packets at overloaded resources and by charging a fixed small amount for each mark received, end-nodes are provided with the necessary information and the correct incentive to use the network efficiently.

Keywords: charging, critical congestion interval, game theory, Internet, proportionally fair pricing, rate control, sample path shadow prices.

• Damon Wischik's demonstration software
  
• Microsoft's Congestion Pricing and a Distributed Game
• Other references on a self-managed Internet
• Bob Briscoe's Design for tussle, and Flow rate fairness: dismantling a religion.
  
• Collective Effects and Performance of Algorithmic Electric Vehicle Charging Strategies